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In 1997, seventeen poor rural school districts in New Jersey filed a lawsuit seeking a 
declaration that their districts were in violation of its students’ state constitutional 
right to a “thorough and efficient” education, and a financial remedy akin to the one 
granted to poor urban districts in Abbott v. Burke. Fifteen years and four decisions 
later, these districts are still inadequately funded and providing a constitutionally 
inadequate education to the students therein. This Article analyzes the state of 
education funding law in New Jersey, under the governing Abbott v. Burke decisions, 
and argues that there is no significant legal distinction barring the poor rural districts 
from access to the same, or similar, remedial measures.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Must the state intervene to protect, to the absolute fullest, the paramount constitutional right to 
a “thorough and efficient” education belonging to all New Jersey students attending constitutionally 
deficient schools?  Should an impoverished town that is incapable of funding a constitutionally adequate 
education for its students be excluded from constitutionally mandated remedial funding based on its 
urbanization and demographics?  These are the questions raised by Bacon v. New Jersey Department of 
Education.1  Bacon challenges the New Jersey Supreme Court to extend the same constitutional safeguard 
of the right to a “thorough and efficient” education—which is the baseline level of education guaranteed 
by the New Jersey State Constitution, also described as the level needed to prepare children to function 
in modern society—and to provide the  funding remedies that poor urban districts receive (hereinafter 
the Abbott districts) to poor rural school districts (hereinafter the Bacon districts) as well. 
In 1973, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in Robinson v. Cahill2 that the education clause in 
the New Jersey state constitution provided a substantive right for students, ages five to eighteen, to 
receive a mandatory minimum level of education.  If a school was incapable of providing an education 
that was constitutionally satisfactory, then the school district, and therefore the state of New Jersey, was 
guilty of a constitutional violation.  Over the next twenty-eight years, in two separate lines of litigation—
Robinson, which established the constitutional right to education in New Jersey, and Abbott v. Burke in 
1990, which mandated explicit and direct funding increases to thirty urban school districts (hereinafter 
the Abbott districts)—the New Jersey Supreme Court repeatedly found that urban school districts were 
severely underfunded and the resulting educational output was a definitive violation of the constitutional 
right to a “thorough and efficient” education.3  The Abbott litigation has generated countless law review 
articles, books, colloquia, and informal debate on a wide range of issues, from school funding to the 
effectiveness of the judiciary in crafting a substantial remedy.  Most importantly, a full twenty-one 
decisions have been handed down in the Abbott litigation, with the most recent New Jersey Supreme 
Court ruling issued in May of 2011.  The remedy crafted by the state supreme court has been 
meticulously refined over the twenty-one decisions, and whenever the Abbott districts believe their 
remedy is threatened by the state legislature’s actions, they seek redress from the judiciary. 
Meanwhile, in 1997, a group of rural districts filed suit, to little fanfare, seeking an extension of 
the school funding remedy that the New Jersey Supreme Court had granted the poor urban districts in 
the Abbott cases.  The litigation, Bacon v. New Jersey Department of Education, languished in New Jersey’s 
administrative law courts for eleven years.  The common thread throughout the four Bacon rulings was 
delay.  Ultimately, the judiciary found constitutional violations in all of the Bacon districts—similar in 
kind, though not in magnitude—to the violation previously found in the Abbott districts.  Fourteen years 
after the filing of the first complaint and three years after the latest court decision in their favor, the 
Bacon districts have yet to receive the funding remedy their students so desperately need and to which 
they are constitutionally entitled. 
This Note argues that the rural school districts in New Jersey, known as the “Bacon districts,” 
must receive a monetary remedy to redress the constitutional violation of the right to a “thorough and 
efficient” education, a right which students in these districts are being denied.  Part II will summarize 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Bacon v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ. (Bacon I), OAL DKT NOS. EDU 2637-00–2656-00, 2002 WL 31232958 (N.J. 
Adm. Sept. 23, 2002). 
2 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
3 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
170   Bringing Home the Bacon Vol. 2:1 
 
and analyze the lengthy judicial history of education finance litigation in the state of New Jersey.  Part III 
will introduce the Bacon litigation and, through an analysis of the decisions and an invocation of the 
judicial standards set forth in Abbott, demonstrate how the level of education provided in the Bacon 
districts was and still is constitutionally inadequate, and thus requires a remedy.  Part IV will discuss the 
reasons why the Abbott remedy should be extended to the Bacon districts. 
II. EDUCATION FINANCE REFORM IN NEW JERSEY: A JUDICIAL HISTORY4 
Part II provides an overview of the history of education finance litigation in New Jersey, starting from 
1970 and ending at 1998.  The most important judicial decisions in this area prior to the start of the 
Bacon litigation are examined for their legal significance, in chronological order.  The foundation of 
knowledge necessary to examine the Bacon litigation will be erected here, and by the end of the section, 
the reader will have a working understanding of the legal reasoning behind the holdings in the landmark 
Robinson and Abbott cases.  The reader will also gain an appreciation of the legal struggle involved 
in earning and safeguarding a New Jersey student’s constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” 
education.  
A. 1970-1975: The Beginning of Education Equity Litigation in New Jersey 
1. Serrano  and Rodr iguez : The Beginning and End of a Federal Right to Education 
The story of New Jersey educational equity litigation has roots in the early 1970s in the 
courthouses of Los Angeles County.  The landmark decision from the California Supreme Court in 
Serrano v. Priest5 resulted in a deluge of attacks on state funding statutes for public schools throughout the 
country.6  The plaintiffs in Serrano were students in California public schools who claimed that the 
California regime for financing public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  California’s plan for financing public schools, which “relie[d] heavily on local property 
taxes,” resulted in “substantial disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue 
available per pupil.”7  The plaintiffs alleged that the immensely disparate levels of funding8 invariably 
contributed to the disparate levels of education offered to students in California, resulting in a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In finding for the plaintiffs on a motion to dismiss and remanding the case for trial, the 
California Supreme Court rested its opinion largely upon its decision to apply strict scrutiny as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For an excellent historical narrative of the education litigation in New Jersey, including biographical 
descriptions of the key political and legal players, see DEBORAH YAFFE, OTHER PEOPLE’S CHILDREN: THE BATTLE FOR 
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY IN NEW JERSEY’S SCHOOLS (2008). 
5 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584 (Cal. 1971). 
6 Challenges to state funding regimes were brought in over thirty states, including New Jersey.  In this sweeping 
reform period of the early 1970s, prior to the Rodriguez case, see infra pp. 6–8, only two states where challenges took place, 
New York and Indiana retained their school finance statutes unaltered.  Paul L. Tractenberg, New Jersey: Robinson v. 
Cahill: The “Thorough and Efficient” Clause, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 312, 312–13 (1974). 
7 Serrano, 5 Cal.3d at 590.   
8 By relying on local property taxes, individual school districts were dependent on the assessed valuation of the 
real property within the district’s borders.  Beverly Hills, with an assessed tax base value of $50,855 per student, spent 
$1,231.72 per student in 1970 on education.  By comparison, a school district in Los Angeles County possessed an 
assessed value of $3,706 per student, and spent $577.49 per student in that same academic year.  Id. at 594. 
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appropriate judicial standard of review.  First, the court interpreted United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence as considering wealth to be a suspect classification.9  Second, the court ruled that 
education was a fundamental interest.10  With strict scrutiny therefore established, the court had no 
difficulty in finding that the government lacked any compelling interest in establishing a system that 
heavily relies upon local property taxes for school funding.  Challenges to education funding regimes 
were then filed in many states, utilizing the legal reasoning from the California Supreme Court in Serrano 
and relying upon the Equal Protection Clause as their primary legal strategy.11  
Eventually, one of the education reform cases filed in the wake of Serrano reached the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.12  The case 
originated in San Antonio, Texas, and challenged a school funding system and an overall educational 
dilemma very similar to the one found in Serrano: an overreliance on local property taxes which created a 
disparity in wealth among districts.  In Rodriguez, however, the Court decided that it was improper to 
invoke the strict scrutiny test to review the challenge to Texas’s school funding laws.  Rejecting the 
theories by which the Serrano court established strict scrutiny as the requisite standard, the Court ruled 
that the appellants in Rodriguez failed to establish education as a fundamental right under the federal 
Constitution13 and also that the appellants did not qualify as a suspect class based on wealth 
considerations.14  
From there, the Court applied the rational basis test, a significantly weaker standard that merely 
requires the government to prove a legitimate state interest in the chosen legislation.  The court found 
that local autonomy over school funding and curriculum by way of property taxation was a legitimate 
state interest, citing the tradition and importance of local control over education.15  Reliance upon 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Id. at 597 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has demonstrated a marked antipathy toward legislative 
classifications which discriminate on the basis of certain ‘suspect’ personal characteristics.  One factor which has 
repeatedly come under the close scrutiny of the high court is wealth.  ‘Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, 
like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.’” (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) 
(invalidating the Virginia poll tax, finding that payment of a fee to determine a person’s qualification to vote to be a 
“capricious or irrelevant factor.”)) 
10 “[T]he distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it 
as a ‘fundamental interest.’”  Id. at 608–09. 
11 The Serrano decision was both groundbreaking and significant.  Time magazine described it as “[p]otentially . . 
. the most far-reaching court ruling on schooling since Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.”  Tractenberg, supra note 6, at 
312 n.2 (citing Education: Dividing the Cake, TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 47).   
12 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
13 “Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”  Id. at 35.  
14 “The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. It has not been shown to discriminate against 
any definable class of ‘poor’ people or to occasion discriminations depending on the relative wealth of the families in any 
district.”  Id. at 1.  
15 In addressing the importance of local autonomy over school spending, the Court referenced Justice 
Brandeis’s observation that “one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government [is] each State’s freedom to ‘serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.’” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  The majority in Rodriguez welcomed state-by-state differences in 
education finance laws, in particular: “[n]o area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints 
and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.”  Id. at 50.  This attitude has resulted in the capricious 
nature of education funding. 
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property taxes as a means of financing public education thus survived judicial scrutiny under the rational 
basis standard.  Rodriguez shut down one means of attacking state education funding laws.16  In addition, 
Rodriguez foreclosed any future litigation regarding the violation of federal constitutional rights concerning 
educational equity.17 
2. Robinson : The “Thorough and Efficient” Clause and the Establishment of a State 
Right to Education 
Shortly after Rodriguez, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a new means of attacking 
education funding on the state level.  In launching an attack on the same disparate reality found in 
California and Texas, plaintiffs in the 1973 New Jersey case of Robinson v. Cahill18 relied upon the same 
legal arguments that had been successful in Serrano.  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, two weeks before 
the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down the decision in Robinson, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its ruling in Rodriguez, preempting the New Jersey court and defeating the federal equal protection 
claim alleged by the plaintiffs in Robinson.19  Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down 
the state’s education funding scheme as unconstitutional.  To do so, the majority relied upon education 
amendments made to the New Jersey State Constitution in 1875 which mandated that the state provide a 
“thorough and efficient” school system.20 The amendments and the language therein allowed the New 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 For a detailed look at the Rodriguez litigation and its impact on the strategies taken in education litigation in 
the following decades, see PAUL A. SRACIC, SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUAL EDUCATION: 
THE DEBATE OVER DISCRIMINATION AND SCHOOL FUNDING (2006). 
17 One of the lasting results of Rodriguez, coupled with the developments in subsequent state litigation, is that 
the fundamental right to education is inconsistently applied.  The right is enjoyed differently by students depending on 
the state in which they live and whether the state’s judiciary has acknowledged a fundamental right to education and 
ruled in favor of challenges to the state’s education finance system.  For example, one of the more swift and efficient 
declarations of education equity occurred in Kentucky during the late 1980’s.  Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).  Compare New York, where claims of unconstitutional school funding were rejected throughout 
the 1980’s and the right to a “sound basic education” was later won in the 1990’s, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State (CFE I), 86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995); and finally, the funding apparatus was declared unconstitutional after lengthy 
discovery culminated in a 2003 ruling.  Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003). 
Speaking to the results due to inconsistencies from Rodriguez, several states have upheld the constitutionality of 
their education finance system. See, e.g., Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (high court failed to find 
evidence of the funding system causing a constitutional harm);  Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000) (high 
court refused to hear the litigation on grounds of non-justiciable claims);  Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956 (Pa. 
1998) (ruling that claim was non-justiciable and dismissing the case with prejudice because funding was a legislative 
function not subject to judicial discretion); see also Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996) (finding 
that disparities in wealth from property taxes did not violate state constitutional education clause and that evaluating 
school quality and school reform were legislative and not judicial matters).  In the wake of Rodriguez, a student’s access to 
equity in education funding is dependent upon location. 
For an overview of the education equity litigation and the current status of education funding in all fifty states, 
see generally Access: Education Finance Litigation, School Funding Policy and Advocacy, NATIONAL EDUCATION ACCESS 
NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/state_by_state.php3 (last visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
18 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) 
19 Tractenberg, supra note 6, at 321. 
20 Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 285. The New Jersey State Constitution clause reads: “The Legislature shall provide 
for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in 
the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.”  N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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Jersey Supreme Court to establish a state constitutional right to education, phrased as “thorough and 
efficient,” despite the Rodriguez Court’s failure to acknowledge the existence of a federal right to 
education.21 
The court did not define the phrase “thorough and efficient” with any particular precision or 
depth in this first case, beyond indicating that it was an education that prepared children to be 
functioning citizens in society.22  For the moment, the majority also declared that the state constitution’s 
clause required an “equal educational opportunity” for all New Jersey students.23   
The Robinson decision in 1973 laid the legal groundwork for the forthcoming Abbott decisions by 
providing the blueprint for successful educational equity litigation.  The majority explicitly held that, if a 
minimum level of education was not provided to the students, then the state was in violation of the 
constitution: “[a] system of instruction in any district of the State which is not ‘thorough and efficient’ falls 
short of the constitutional command.”24  Further, the majority wrote that where education fails to meet 
the constitutional requirement, “[w]hatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State’s to 
rectify it,” even if the state delegated its duty to a local government.25  Consequently, this last phrase 
holds the state government liable for instances of constitutionally inadequate education provided by local 
school districts under a system that relies heavily upon property taxes to fund public education. 
3. The End of the Robinson  Litigation: The Public Education Act of 1975 
The second Robinson decision in 197326 held that the New Jersey legislature was in dereliction of 
its duty to provide all New Jersey students a “thorough and efficient” education system.  The Court 
wanted the legislature to respond to the problem by devising and enacting a remedy to address the 
funding disparity, even issuing a decision in Robinson III to grant more time for proper action, but the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 All 50 states have language within their constitutions that address education.  
22 Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295. “The Constitution’s guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational 
opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in 
the labor market.” Id. The phrasing suggests an evolving standard that expands as our society grows more complex and, 
in particular, the global labor market requires increasingly higher-level skills to compete for employment. The end result 
would be a flexible doctrine that guarantees an ever-increasing baseline level of education, one reflecting the changing 
demands of society. 
In CFE II, thirty years after the Robinson I decision, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the State’s 
argument that an eighth-grade level of education was sufficient for making students function productively in civic 
activities and able to compete in employment.  CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 906. Language from the majority’s concluding 
statements imply an evolving standard, as described above: “a sound basic education back in 1894, when the Education 
Article was added, may well have consisted of an eighth or ninth grade education, which we unanimously reject. The 
definition of a sound basic education must serve the future as well as the case now before us.”  Id. at 931.  For further 
discussion on why the constitutional floor for education must rise to meet society’s demands, see id. at 934–36 n.7–9 
(citing expert analysis on the difficulties faced by people without a high school education in modern society). 
23 Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 294 (emphasis added). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson II), 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973). 
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effort was for naught: due to gridlock and disagreement, the legislature failed to act.27  The plaintiffs 
returned to court and the decision in Robinson IV jolted the legislature into action: the court approved a 
provisional remedy that would have elevated available funding per pupil by nearly fifty percent.28  
The legislature finally acted in response to Robinson IV and passed the Public School Education 
Act of 1975 (hereinafter the 1975 Act).29  The 1975 Act purported to increase aid to the poorest school 
districts, raise per-pupil expenditures to an acceptable level and thus remedy the violation of the 
constitutional right to education.  The 1975 Act also contained an early attempt at defining what is 
required for the existence of a “thorough and efficient” educational system: “free public schools shall 
provide to all children in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location, the 
educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and socially in a 
democratic society.”30 
To achieve this balance, the 1975 Act would raise state education aid for municipalities to a level 
that would achieve constitutionally satisfactory funding for every school district in New Jersey.31  Since 
school districts relied almost exclusively on local property tax bases for funding, the 1975 Act aimed to 
share the responsibility of school funding between local and state governments, retaining but 
supplementing the old methods of generating revenue.32  
Central to the successful implementation of the 1975 Act was the required increase in revenue 
for raising per-pupil expenditures.  The court noted that, in the absence of funding, “[the 1975 Act] 
could never be considered [to be in] constitutional compliance” with the requirement that the state 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson III), 335 A.2d 6, 7 (N.J. 1975).  Court orders requesting or even demanding a 
legislative overhaul of the education budget and greatly increased spending can result in great delay for myriad of 
reasons.  See also Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 8 N.Y.3d 14 (2006).  CFE III was the third decision 
in the CFE litigation and came three years after CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003), in which the court declared the state 
education funding scheme unconstitutional and ordered the legislature devise a remedy.  CFE III was litigated because 
the legislature failed to act in the three-year interim, due to disputes within the legislature over the level of funding 
necessary to satisfy the state high court’s order. 
28 Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713, 720–22 (N.J. 1975).  Guaranteed valuation rate per pupil was 
$43,000 for the 1975–76 academic school year; the Court order would have increased that total by over fifty percent to 
$67,000. 
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1 (repealed 1996).  The 1975 Act was an example of political pragmatism, as it 
contained something for all the political parties involved in passing the legislation.  Where this attempt to please 
everyone proved problematic was in securing support for establishing the New Jersey state income tax, which was the 
crucial mechanism to fund the bill.  The New Jersey Education Association (NJEA), the formidable teachers union, 
aggressively fought against demands from state Republicans for accountability on spending by measuring educational 
outputs via standardizing testing and graduation rates, in return for their votes on establishing the state income tax.  
BARBARA G. SALMORE & STEPHEN A. SALMORE, NEW JERSEY POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: THE SUBURBS COME OF 
AGE 315–18 (2008).  
30 Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 132 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V).  This definition, like others prior, is quite 
broad in scope and would require judicial interpretation to establish a baseline requirement. 
31 Id. at 137. 
32 The shared responsibility provision was the state’s attempt to split the financial burden of providing a 
constitutionally adequate education with the local school districts.  The provision was paramount to the 1975 Act’s 
remedy for a constitutionally inadequate education system.  Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of this provision, 
arguing that it was the state attempting to abandon its full constitutional duties to students.  Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 133.  
The court rejected these claims and upheld the 1975 Act as constitutional on its face. 
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provide a “thorough and efficient” education to all students.33  Thus, the court ruled that the 1975 Act 
was constitutional on its face, however accompanying this ruling was a stern warning: if the legislature 
failed to enact legislation that fully funded the 1975 Act, the court would, in the absence of a showing of 
cause, implement its own solutions.34  
B. 1976-1990: Abbot t  v .  Burke  and the Urban Dilemma 
1. The Post-Robinson  Plight of Urban Districts 
In 1981, the Education Law Center (ELC) 35 filed the first Abbott v. Burke case (Abbott I), alleging 
that the 1975 Act established an unconstitutional school funding system in New Jersey.36  Six years after 
the New Jersey legislature’s attempt to ameliorate the unconstitutional school funding scheme identified 
in the Robinson litigation, the ELC presented overwhelming statistical evidence that a wide gulf in 
education funding still existed between two distinct groups of school districts: the poor urban cities and 
their wealthier suburban satellite towns.37   
Abbott I was brought on behalf of four plaintiff-students in urban districts and the lawsuit alleged 
that the funding regime in place was unconstitutional as applied to these poor urban districts.38  From 
the beginning, the plaintiffs’ focus was on correcting the injustice of a constitutionally inadequate 
education provided to students in urban school districts.  This focus has carried throughout the entirety 
of the Abbott litigation history.39  The evidentiary record created by the plaintiffs’ initial focus in Abbott I 
has guided the court in the twenty-one decisions that followed. 
Plaintiffs introduced evidence in Abbott I demonstrating that the gap in per-pupil expenditure 
had actually increased after the passage of the 1975 Act.  Dividing the state’s school districts into seven 
groupings based on wealth, the plaintiffs alleged that weighted per-pupil expenditures in the wealthiest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Id. at 131–32. 
34 The court outlined three steps it was prepared to take, declaring that it would “order one or more” as it saw 
fit, barring a showing of cause by the legislature that explained the delay in funding the 1975 Act and demonstrated why 
such moves were unnecessary.  Id. at 139.  The three orders were: a redistribution of State Aid monies as the court saw 
necessary to satisfy the 1975 Act; order injunctive relief deemed “appropriate and necessary”; and order other relief as 
deemed “appropriate and necessary.”  Id. 
35 Professor Paul Tractenberg, a faculty member at the Rutgers School of Law-Newark, founded the ELC in 
1973 to concentrate the legal efforts in combating “New Jersey’s discriminatory practice of funding suburban schools at 
a much higher level than urban schools.”  Marilyn Morheuser, who was named executive director in 1979, was a former 
law student of Professor Tractenberg. History of the Education Law Center, EDUC. LAW CTR., 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/about/mission-history.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
36 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985). 
37 Id. at 287 (citing Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 (App. Div. 1984) (segments of Superior Court decision 
summarizing the statistical data provided by plaintiffs at trial)). 
38 For a more detailed description of Raymond Abbott and the other plaintiffs in the Abbott case, see YAFFE, 
OTHER PEOPLE’S CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 110–44, 214–48, 304–21. 
39 In leading the Education Law Center (ELC) through the Abbott litigation in the 1980s, Ms. Marilyn 
Morheuser imparted on the organization her indomitable spirit and zeal, despite concerns over her own lack of adequate 
funding to fight for adequate funding for the state’s poor urban students.  As a result, the ELC believed “[their fight] 
was a holy struggle in which they occupied the moral high ground.”  YAFFE, OTHER PEOPLE’S CHILDREN supra note 4, 
at 153–54. 
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group was $1,681 in 197576, while the poorest group spent $1,372; a difference of $309.  In 197980, 
however, the wealthiest group of districts spent $2,529 per-pupil, compared to $1,924 per-pupil in the 
poorest group: a difference of $605.40  The legislature designed the 1975 Act to close the spending gap 
between the richest and poorest districts in New Jersey, but the gap was still increasing.  
At the heart of the initial Abbott filings, however, was the claim that the 1975 Act still relied too 
heavily upon local property taxes for the bulk of school funding.  Under the 1975 Act, determinations of 
state aid to local districts used the local property tax base as a factor.41 Exemplifying the funding 
disparity that still existed despite the legislature’s efforts in 1975, the poorer districts were spending an 
estimated $600 less per pupil while taxing its citizens nearly seventy cents more per $100 of assessed 
property value ($1.65 per $100 for poor districts; $0.97 per $100 for wealthy districts).42  Because of the 
Robinson litigation, increased state aid to municipalities mandated by the 1975 Act fell far short of equity 
in funding, despite contributing more state education aid than ever before.43 
2. Abbot t  II :  The  Court Declares Education Funding Unconstitutional 
In Abbott I, the court rejected motions to dismiss from the State and remanded the matter for a 
trial to establish an evidentiary record before the case inevitably returned to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.44  After a nine-month trial, which included daunting amounts of witness testimony and 
evidence,45 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Steve Lefelt produced a massive 607-page decision in favor 
of the ELC—a decision that “rejected virtually all of the state’s case.”46  Because of the ELC’s pleadings 
and the plaintiffs attached to the Abbott litigation, the ALJ’s fact-finding focus was primarily on the poor 
urban districts.  Paramount to the ALJ’s reasoning was a finding that overreliance on local property 
taxation meant that citizens in urban districts, taxing themselves at a far higher rate than their suburban 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 386 n.2.  
41 Robinson V, 355 A.2d 129, 136–38 (N.J. 1976). 
42 A Short History of School Finance Litigation in New Jersey, 1970–2009: The 1980s: Abbott v. Burke, 
DEBORAHYAFFE.COM, http://www.deborahyaffe.com/finance/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
43 Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 386 n.2 (1985).  The 1975 Act did not prevent the funding gap from increasing, but it 
did slow the rate at which it did.  The second-poorest grouping of districts actually had smaller weighted per-pupil 
expenditures than the poorest grouping because the 1975 Act sent larger amounts of state aid to the poorest districts.  
The data suggests that, in the absence of any reform resulting from the Robinson cases, the gap between the very richest 
and very poorest would have been even larger. 
44 In Abbott I, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the Abbott litigation remanded to an administrative law 
court for initial hearings in order to build a “firm factual foundation before [the New Jersey Supreme Court] ruled on 
Abbott’s merits.”  YAFFE, OTHER PEOPLE’S CHILDREN, supra note 4, at 147.  See Abbott I, 495 A.2d at 386 n.2 (1985). 
45 YAFFE, supra note 4, at 166.  The initial trial featured 99 witnesses, 745 exhibits of evidence, over 16,000 
pages of testimony, included 160 factual findings from the ALJ “on everything from the validity of competing statistical 
methods to the prevalence of mismanagement in urban districts.”  Id. at 167, 168.  Further exemplifying Ms. 
Morheuser’s devotion to the cause, she seemed to require her witnesses to pass an ideological purity test.  She once 
stated that “as we come to zero hour [prior to trial], I am more and more convinced that we need true believers as 
witnesses.” Id. at 153. 
46 Id. at 168.  
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counterparts, could never close the funding gap that existed no matter how hard they tried.47  The State 
appealed the decision. 
As anticipated, the New Jersey Supreme Court heard the case on appeal from the ALJ and, 
relying upon the extensive factual record established at trial, issued its landmark ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs in Abbott II.48  The court ruled on a number of issues in Abbott II that continue to impact 
education law and school finance in New Jersey to this day.  For one, the court rejected the State’s 
assertion that per-pupil expenditure calculations should take into account any aid from the federal 
government that a district receives for its schools.49  The court wanted to divorce New Jersey school 
funding from the dangers of “substantial fluctuation” in federal government spending.50  Second, in 
addressing the plaintiffs’ complaints that the 1975 Act was still too reliant upon revenue generated by 
local property taxes, the Court agreed, stating that “while local taxation no longer has the same impact 
[as it did prior to Robinson], it is still [a] significant” factor in determining the total funding available for a 
school district. 51  
Overall, the Court concluded that the failure of schools to provide a constitutionally adequate 
education to students in poor urban districts was invariably related, at least in part, to the lack of 
available funding.  In short, regardless of debates about how significant funding levels are in providing a 
quality education, it is inarguable that funding matters.52  The Court declared that “[t]he failure [of our 
school systems] has gone on too long; the factors are ingrained; the remedy must be systemic. The 
present scheme cannot cure it.”53 
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47 Id. at 169. 
48 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
49 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), Pub. L. No. 107-110, §§ 1001-02, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).  NCLB is the 
current reauthorization of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).  The federal government 
disperses funds to districts that qualify as disadvantaged under the NCLB criteria. At the time of trial, the four districts 
which the plaintiffs represented all received federal education aid under the iteration of ESEA then in effect.  At the 
time, federal ESEA funding amounted to five percent of the districts’ current expense budgets, as compared to a 
nationwide average of eight percent.  If federal funds were factored in, the disparity between poor and rich districts 
“decreased, sometimes dramatically.”  Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the “thorough and efficient” clause requires 
the state to provide an adequate education without any federal assistance whatsoever.  Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 380–81. 
50 Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 381 n.14.  The Court believed a remedial funding framework whereby the poorest 
districts receive federal aid as supplementary but separate from their needs as calculated by the state would result in 
greater overall funding for said districts.  “If New Jersey’s funding scheme were equal and fair, which it is not, federal aid 
would continue, and together with state and local expenditures it would provide an even greater opportunity to educate 
disadvantaged children” Id. at 381 (emphasis added).   
51 Id. at 384. 
52 The state argued that, even though children in the poorest urban districts generally perform worse than their 
counterparts in wealthy suburban districts, plenty of students in the poorest districts nevertheless succeed despite the 
conditions.  The Court dismissed this as irrelevant, noting that “[the] constitutional mandate does not allow us to 
consign poorer children permanently to an inferior education on the theory that they cannot afford a better one or that 
they would not benefit from it.”  Id. at 385, 386. 
53 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 384 (N.J. 1990). 
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3. Abbot t  II : The Urban Evidence and The Limited Remedy 
Faced with the tremendous evidentiary record detailing the plight of poor urban districts in New 
Jersey established by the trial court, the court’s Abbott II decision explicitly limited its remedy to twenty-
eight poor urban districts, now called the Abbott districts.54  These districts were selected after an analysis 
of the statistical evidence compiled by the New Jersey Department of Education (NJ DOE).  Evidence 
of the constitutional violations was found in a number of categories, including the following: 
impoverished communities and school funding, standardized test results, and crumbling facilities. 
The NJ DOE devised its own test based on multiple criteria to assign a value and ranking to 
each school district in the state based on socioeconomic status, and from there, sorted the districts into 
District Factor Groups (DFGs).55  Districts received a DFG letter grade to denote the group to which 
they belonged on a scale from A to J, A representing the poorest districts and J the wealthiest.56  These 
classifications played a significant role in providing evidence to the court of a constitutional violation to 
the right to a “thorough and efficient” system of education in the poor urban districts.  It is important to 
note that the fifth and sixth criteria, density and urbanization, worked against demonstrating the poverty 
of non-urban districts in New Jersey.  If a rural or suburban district, otherwise poor and needy, did not 
have a profile that fit the density and urbanization criteria, it would have impacted their DFG rating by 
marking them as less needy than their urban counterparts despite the fact that the two sets of school 
districts confronted identical funding and tax base issues. 
When viewed by these DFG categories, large gaps existed between the poorest urban and 
wealthiest suburban districts in both per-pupil expenditure and the local property tax base. The state 
average per-pupil expenditure in the 198485 school year was $3,329.  During that school year, school 
districts in DFG J spent $1,245 more per-pupil than districts in DFG A ($4,154 compared to $2,909). In 
terms of property value, the state average was $190,401 of property value per pupil. DFG J possessed a 
staggering $281,879 more in property value per-pupil than their DFG A counterparts ($360,101 
compared to only $78,222).57  Summarizing the findings in the record, the court noted that “[n]o 
sophisticated analysis can destroy the conclusion: the richer districts spend more than the poorer, and 
their ability to do so is strongly correlated to their wealth.”58  By highlighting the dramatic disparity in 
actual per-pupil education spending between rich and poor school districts, and in the local wealth base 
through which districts can secure additional funding via local property tax increases, the court put to 
rest the argument that poor districts can overcome funding issues on their own. 
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54 “[T]hese poorer urban districts . . . [are] the sole object of the remedy we impose.”  Id. at 387. The court 
acknowledged that “[t]he primary basis for our decision is the constitutional failure of education in poorer urban 
districts.”  Id. at 394. 
55 At the time, seven factors were calculated in determining a school district’s DFG ranking: “1) per capita 
income level, 2) occupation level, 3) education level, 4) percent of residents below the poverty level, 5) density (the 
average number of persons per household), 6) urbanization (percent of district considered urban), and 7) unemployment 
(percent of those in the work force who received some unemployment compensation).” Id. at 385. 
56 District Factor Groups (DFGs) for School Districts, N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/finance/sf/dfg90.shtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  The classifications are A, BC, CD, 
DE, EF, GH, I and J, with A being the poorest and J the wealthiest districts. As of the 2000 Census, there were 549 
school districts in New Jersey that were evaluated by DFG criteria and assigned a group, the breakdown was as follows: 
A = 39 districts, B = 67, CD = 67, DE = 83, FG = 89, GH = 76, I = 103 and J = 25.  Id. 
57 Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 388. 
58 Id. 
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After determining that the funding disparity was significant and would continue to exist in the 
absence of state intervention, the court then found that the disparate levels of funding correlated with 
disparate levels of achievement.  The court also found evidence of a constitutional violation of the 
students’ right to a “thorough and efficient” system of education in an examination of standardized tests.  
In the 198586 school year, all but two districts in DFG A and B failed to meet the established state 
standard for the High School Proficiency Test (HSPT).59  Most startling about these failure rates is that 
the HSPT tested students for “mastery of basic skills . . .  the minimum level of learning needed to go on 
to more difficult subjects.”60   The legislature admitted that the test was a “prerequisite to, not the 
equivalent of, a thorough and efficient education.”61  In essence, the situation was so dire that high school 
students in the poorest school districts were performing so poorly that they did not possess the 
prerequisite knowledge to competently benefit from the absolute minimum level of education that the 
New Jersey Constitution requires.62 
Inadequate facilities also played a major role in declaring New Jersey’s education funding scheme 
unconstitutional.  Both for their impact upon the ability to provide a “thorough and efficient” education 
and for the lasting imagery the poor conditions left upon the justices.63  The court explicitly declared that 
“[a] thorough and efficient education also requires adequate physical facilities.”64  Several examples of 
facilities were cited as failing because of educational inadequacy,65 athletic inadequacy,66 safety hazards,67 
and hygienic concerns.68  Just as important was the simple issue of space: schools in poor urban districts 
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59 Id. at 400.  Today, New Jersey administers the High School Proficiency Assessment (HSPA), a test with a 
slightly altered name and largely the same goals.  One key difference is the grade level: the HSPT (High School 
Proficiency Test) in the record at trial was administered to ninth graders, id., whereas the current HSPA is given to 
eleventh graders.  High School Statewide Assessments, N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/assessment/hs/hspa/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  
60 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 400 (N.J. 1990) 
61 Id. 
62 Id. HSPT testing data from the three covered subjects – math, reading and writing – demonstrated that 
students from the poor urban districts posted passing scores at significantly lower rates than the state average, and an 
even greater disparity existed between the poor urban districts and the wealthy DFG J districts.  
63 The New Jersey Supreme Court justices’ reactions demonstrate how dramatic the case presented was, in 
particular, the conditions of school facilities in poor urban districts.  Stories of “leaking roofs, broken plumbing, and lack 
of heat in urban school building[s]” outraged several of the justices.  In reflecting upon Abbott II several years after the 
decision, Justice Gary Stein described how he believed “[i]t was shameful for the state to have school buildings that were 
so decrepit. . . . [I]t was evidence of callousness and neglect.”  YAFFE, supra note 4, at 189. 
64 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 397 (N.J. 1990). 
65 Id. at 395. While wealthier suburbs possessed dedicated science laboratory rooms and state-of-the-art 
equipment, “many poor urban districts offer[ed] science classes in labs built in the 1920’s and 1930’s, where sinks do not 
work [and] equipment . . . is not available . . .”  
66 Id. at 396. For example, none of Irvington’s elementary schools had an outdoor playground for recess or 
physical education. East Orange, another poor urban district, had no sports facilities available for its high school 
student-athletes. 
67 Id. at 397. The long-term repairs report for the East Orange school district listed thirteen facilities in need of 
asbestos removal and ten requiring “immediate” roof repair. 
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lacked space for classrooms thus leading to larger class sizes held in smaller rooms compared to their 
wealthy suburban counterparts.69 
Despite the findings that DFG A or B school districts were significantly worse off than their 
wealthy counterparts, the court limited the scope of its judicial remedy by eliminating all the non-urban 
districts that were rated as DFG A or B.  Within the poorest two DFG gradings, there were a total of 
twenty-nine districts classified by the NJ DOE as urban.70  Relying upon the DFG calculations, the 
ample evidence on record and the NJ DOE’s classification of districts as urban, suburban or rural, the 
court decided that the poorest urban districts—those districts with a DFG rating of A or B and that also 
qualify as urban—would be the subject of the remedy the court provided.  Excluded from this grouping 
were the other twenty-seven districts identified as urban but which did not face a socioeconomic 
situation dire enough to warrant access to the remedy.  Also excluded were any suburban or rural 
districts that would have qualified via socioeconomic status but were disqualified based on urbanization 
classification.71  The court’s reasoning for exclusion was blunt: because the rural districts are not urban, 
“they are therefore not as poor or needy.”72  Little explanation was provided by the court for this 
proclamation.  The court seemed to defer to the DOE’s decision to include urbanization and population 
density as factors in the DFG formula finding that, because those factors were considered relevant to a 
determination of poverty or need among school districts, the absence of these factors implies lesser 
poverty or need.73 
The ELC’s singular focus on poor urban plaintiffs produced an evidentiary record in Abbott that 
did not include descriptions of constitutional violations occurring in impoverished, non-urban districts.  
The court believed it was constrained to rule based upon the evidence before it.  With the most 
underfunded and failing schools located in New Jersey’s bleak urban areas, and with the racial 
composition of the schools reaching over ninety percent minority student enrollment, the ELC made the 
conscious decision to select plaintiffs from cities like Camden and Trenton to represent their case.  The 
ELC picked the most compelling, extreme circumstances to establish their legal case, and the 
unfortunate consequence of this strategy was the disregard for dissimilar school districts with similarly 
failing schools.  The court concluded that “there is no direct substantive evidence on [the Abbott II trial] 
record of [the rural districts’] failure to provide a thorough and efficient education.”74  The court also 
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68 Id. Whereas schools in wealthier suburban districts were “newer, cleaner and safer,” one classroom in 
Irvington was converted from its old usage as a coal bin and an elementary school in Paterson used the basement boiler 
room as cafeteria space. 
69 Id. at 395–97. Lack of space foreclosed adding programs in supplementary subjects, such as foreign language, 
computer or music education, as there was insufficient space for teaching the core subjects.  
70 At the time of Abbott II, there were 56 school districts in total identified as urban. Id. at 386. Today, there are 
64 districts classified as urban in New Jersey. Urban District List, N.J. PRINCIPALS AND SUPERVISORS ASS’N, 
http://www.njpsa.org/documents/pdf/Urban%20District%20List.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
71 One last exclusion in the Abbott II decision was the Atlantic City school district, which was in DFG A and 
classified as urban but possessed a guaranteed tax base “far in excess” of the statutory limit and of the other poor urban 
districts, owing to the multitude of large casinos and shops within city limits. Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990). 
72 Id. at 387. 
73 “These non-included districts do not have the characteristics that lead to classification as urban districts by 
the Department of Community Affairs or by the Commissioner.” Id.  
74 Id. The reasons for the insufficiency of the evidentiary record will be explained later, see discussion infra Part 
III, particularly Part III.B.1. 
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cites the “monumental” needs of students in urban districts, compared to their affluent suburban 
counterparts.  These urban students require the necessities, such as food and shelter, let alone upgraded 
school facilities.75  
With the evidentiary focus squarely on the most compelling poor urban districts within New 
Jersey, the court turned its attention to designing a remedy that would best address the needs of the 
aggrieved poor urban districts.  The Abbott II remedy is stated in broad terms, but the goal is clear: “[T]o 
motivate [poor urban students], to wipe out their disadvantages as much as a school district can, and to give 
them an educational opportunity that will enable them to use their innate ability.”76  In more concrete 
terms, the state had an obligation to “assure that poorer urban districts’ educational funding is 
substantially equal to that of property-rich districts.”77  The court emphasized that equalized funding 
cannot rely upon local property taxes generated by the poorer districts; the aid must come from another 
source, independent of local taxation, devised by the state legislature.78 
C. The 1990s: The Court Asserts Control in Abbot t  
1. Abbot t  IV : Enough is Enough 
In Abbott III, the court provided a deadline for the legislature to rectify the ongoing 
constitutional violations.79  If compliance with Abbott II had a “less than reasonable likelihood” of 
occurring prior to the 1997-98 school year, the court would hear a new motion in the Abbott case.80  In 
response, the legislature passed another remedial statute,81 the Comprehensive Educational 
Improvement and Financing Act (CEIFA).82  
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75 “This record shows that the educational needs of students in poorer urban districts vastly exceed those of 
others, especially those from richer districts. The difference is monumental . . . .” Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 400.  The Court 
goes further and lists many basic needs beyond education reform including, among others, the need for food, clothing, 
shelter, community support, and role models. Id. 
The Court also references the analysis of former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean’s plan to improve the 
quality of education in poor urban districts. Governor Kean “made it clear that his concern was with the quality of 
education in urban areas, in particular, the poorer urban areas.” Id. at 386. 
76 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 400 (N.J. 1990) (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 408 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. at 408, 409 (emphasis added). 
79 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994). At issue in Abbott III was a remedial funding statute 
(the Quality Education Act) that the state legislature designed with the hopes of bringing New Jersey into compliance 
with Abbott II. The court ruled this funding scheme unconstitutional, and then provided a deadline for the state to 
comply with Abbott II.  
80 Id. at 577. 
81 DOE Archives: History of Funding Equity, N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/archive/abbotts/chrono/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2012) [hereinafter DOE Archives]. 
82 Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996 (CEIFA), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7F-
1 (repealed 2007). 
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In the fourth round of the Abbott litigation,83 the ELC alleged that the CEIFA, like the 1975 Act 
from Robinson V, was unconstitutional because it failed to comply with prior court orders for remedying 
the education funding crisis in poor urban districts.84  The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the 
ELC and declared it would no longer tolerate the legislature’s repeated failed efforts to ameliorate the 
constitutional violations occurring in school districts across New Jersey.  The court struck down CEIFA 
as unconstitutional as applied to the poor urban districts listed in Abbott II and began to fashion its own 
remedy.85 
First, the court ruled that the substantive educational requirements of CEIFA (the “thorough” 
prong of the education clause) were, in fact, constitutionally permissible.  The court opted to uphold and 
maintain the education standards,86 but ruled that the funding provisions were “clearly inadequate and 
thus unconstitutional as applied to the special needs districts.”87 CEIFA’s funding problems were 
inherent to the statute.  The statute defined what the legislature considered the constitutionally 
guaranteed minimum level of education.  With the statute defining its own constitutional floor, CEIFA 
then modeled the proposed funding scheme after districts that provided the absolute minimum level of 
education to satisfy the statute, and no more.88  The court believed that the absolute minimum was 
constitutionally inadequate.  The court reemphasized that poor urban districts needed even more funding 
than their wealthy counterparts, as there were significant obstacles in providing a meaningful education 
in these districts.89 
Authored by Justice Alan Handler, the opening remarks of the majority decision in Abbott IV 
reflect the court’s impatience with the legislature and a sense of urgency on behalf of the students whose 
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83 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 429. 
86 Id. at 428. The Court detailed the critical aspects of the CEIFA substantive requirements: standardized tests 
to monitor progress administered in the fourth, eighth and eleventh grades; achievement goals in the seven “core” 
academic areas (“visual and performing arts, comprehensive health and physical education, language-arts literacy, 
mathematics, science, social studies, and world languages”); and freedom for local schools to develop official 
curriculums, so long as they adhere to the aforementioned standards. Id. at 425. 
87 Id. at 429. The court summarized the state’s argument: 
CEIFA must stand or fall based on the validity of its premise that the T & E amount [the statute’s 
fixed per-pupil cost]is sufficient to provide a thorough and efficient education for all students and that 
spending in excess of that amount in the wealthier districts is nothing more than expenditure that is 
inefficient and unnecessary for a thorough and efficient education. 
Id. at 427. 
88 Id. In response, the State claimed that the wealthiest districts that spent the most per pupil on education had 
“notable inefficiencies in their spending practices” and thus were overspending to achieve the level of education they 
provided.  The Court cites the outrage from the wealthier districts in having to defend their levels of education spending, 
and the eventual elimination of the earliest provisions of CEIFA, as proof that “the general perception and widespread 
belief” is that higher spending is not merely “inefficiency or . . . educational luxuries.” Id. 
89 Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 434 (N.J. 1997). “[T]he needs of students in the [poor urban districts] were much 
greater than those of students in the DFG I & J districts.”  These needs include, but are not limited to, early childhood 
programs, supplemental education programs for English as a Second Language (ESL) students and investment in 
facilities (describing many of the schools in these districts as “in dramatic disrepair”). Id. at 438.  
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constitutional rights were being unduly harmed in the absence of an adequate remedy.  Handler 
remarked, “[T]he new act [CEIFA] is incapable of assuring that opportunity for children in the special 
needs districts for any time in the foreseeable future.”90  Later in the opinion, Justice Handler expresses 
in greater chronological detail the Court’s displeasure at how onerous and delayed the implementation of 
a remedy for the problem has been: 
The Legislature has known since July 1994, when we decided Abbott III, that increased 
funding would have to be achieved by the 1997-1998 school year.  That 1994 order, in 
turn, was necessitated by the Legislature’s failure to comply with our 1990 order [in 
Abbott II] calling for remedial relief.  Thus, the State has had seven years to comply with 
a remedy intended to address, albeit partially, a profound deprivation that has continued 
for at least twenty-five years.  Thus, the remedy of increased funding for educational improvement in 
the poor urban districts should not be delayed any further.91 
CEIFA was another failed attempt from the legislature at complying with the court’s orders from Abbott 
II and with remedying the constitutional violation damaging poor students in New Jersey. 
 With CEIFA declared unconstitutional, the court found that the “continued deprivation of the 
constitutional right to a thorough and efficient education necessitate[d] a remedy.”92 Acknowledging the 
“finiteness of judicial power,” the court nevertheless ordered the state to ensure the immediate remedy 
of parity in per-pupil school expenditures between the identified poor urban districts and the school 
districts in DFG I and J for the next school year.93 The court took a bold step here by finding the state 
legislature constitutionally mandated to spend money to ensure parity: the gap in per-pupil expenditures 
had closed from twenty-five percent, at the time of Abbott II, to ten percent in the year 1996.94 
Nevertheless, the court felt that CEIFA stifled the gradual march towards total parity in funding and 
ordered the immediate remedy.95  
In compliance with the Abbott IV decision, the New Jersey legislature allocated $246 million in 
additional state education aid to be distributed to the Abbott districts for the upcoming school year.96  
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90 Id. at 420.  
91 Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at  439. 
93 Id. There are now, and were at the time, approximately 120 school districts in DFG I and J. District Factor 
Groups (DFGs) for School Districts, N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.state.nj.us/education/finance/sf/dfg90.shtml (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2012).   
94 MICHAEL PARIS, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 
139 (2010). 
95 Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 440 (N.J. 1997).  
96 The poor urban districts, or Abbott districts, as they became known, were initially the twenty-eight districts 
identified in the Abbott II decision.  In the fall of 1998, the legislature, pursuant to its authority from Abbott II, classified 
two additional districts as Abbott districts, bringing the total, prior to the Bacon litigation to 30. See infra Part III.A;  
Alexandra Grief, Politics, Practicalities and Priorities: New Jersey’s Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 615, 641 (2004).  
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The calculated spending shortfall resulting from the roughly ten percent gap in per-pupil expenditures 
was $248 million.97 
2. Abbot t  V : The Court Orders Unprecedented Remedial Measures 
In addition to ordering immediate funding parity, the court in Abbott IV remanded the case and 
ordered a study conducted to determine fully the special needs of students in the Abbott districts, the 
programs necessary to address these needs, and the costs associated with implementing the programs.98  
After remand, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott V99 ordered an unprecedented series of 
entitlements for urban schoolchildren.100  The court ordered whole-school reform for elementary 
schools,101  fully funded full-day kindergarten and half-day preschool, construction of new facilities and 
repair of existing facilities as per the recommended school construction plan.102  Litigation continued 
after Abbott V, as plaintiffs sought to protect and ensure full enforcement of the remedy that they 
won.103   Nonetheless, because of jurisprudence culminating with Abbott V, the Abbott districts now had 
a comprehensive, detailed, court-ordered remedy that guaranteed funding parity and provided for a 
multitude of supplemental programs to ensure the delivery of a constitutionally adequate education to its 
students. 
III. VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A “THOROUGH AND 
EFFICIENT” EDUCATION IN NEW JERSEY’S NON-URBAN SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS 
Part III will examine the current constitutional and educational plight of the Bacon districts. A 
complete examination of the entirety of the Bacon litigation, from the first filing until the most recent 
decision from the New Jersey Appellate Division, will provide the necessary legal and historical 
background knowledge. A comparison of the Bacon and Abbott districts follows, demonstrating the 
similarities, both in reality and under the legal doctrine set forth by the various Abbott  decisions, 
between the districts. 
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97 DOE Archives, supra note 81; Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 443 n.35. 
98 Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 444. 
99 Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998). 
100 The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. LAW CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/abbott-v-
burke/abbott-history.html [hereinafter History of Abbott v. Burke]. 
101 Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 473. Broadly speaking, whole-school reform entails dramatically reforming the school 
as one singular institution, rather than approaching problems individually. For a more detailed look at an example plan 
for whole-school reform, see SUCCESS FOR ALL FOUNDATION, http://www.successforall.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).  
102 Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 473. Funding was allotted for further programs, including health services, social 
services, increased security, summer-school programs and after-school programs.  History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 
100. 
103 See generally Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the State failed to implement 
the pre-school reforms ordered in Abbott V); Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VII), 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the 
State must fully fund the school construction plan ordered in Abbott V). To date, Abbott v. Burke has produced three 
decades and twenty-two officially counted decisions.  
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A. Bacon v .  New Jer s ey  Depar tment  o f  Educat ion :  The Rural Districts Petition for Inclusion 
in the Comprehensive Abbott Remedy 
In the opening remarks of the majority opinion in Abbott II, the court foresaw the potential state 
constitutional problems that would arise for school districts that were excluded from the court’s decision 
in 1990: 
On this record we find a constitutional deficiency only in the poorer urban districts, and 
our remedy is limited to those districts.  We leave unaffected the disparity in substantive 
education and funding found in other districts throughout the state, although that disparity 
too may someday become a matter of constitutional dimension.  We do so without implying in any 
way that such disparity is not important when considered as a matter of policy.  Our 
decision deals not with optimum educational policy but with constitutional 
compliance.104 
Seven years after Abbott II, the court’s prediction would prove true, as a new litigation was undertaken on 
behalf of impoverished, constitutionally deficient school districts that were excluded from the Abbott 
remedy by virtue of the court’s confinement of the remedy to poor urban districts. 
1. The Beginning of the Bacon  Litigation: Minor Victories, Major Setbacks 
 In December of 1997, seven months after the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its landmark 
ruling in Abbott IV, a group of seventeen poor rural school districts filed suit in Superior Court in 
litigation known as Bacon v. New Jersey Department of Education.105  These districts alleged that CEIFA was 
unconstitutional as applied to them, echoing the arguments made in Abbott IV by plaintiffs residing in 
poor urban districts.  Plaintiff school districts claimed that, under CEIFA, they lacked sufficient 
education funding to provide the constitutionally required “thorough and efficient” education, and as 
such, they needed state assistance akin to the Abbott districts to alleviate the ongoing constitutional harm.  
The Bacon districts argued that they satisfied all of the Abbott factors, save for one: urban classification.  
Bacon districts are, largely, sparsely populated townships, many of which are considered rural in terms of 
geography and population density.  Nevertheless, they claimed that because of the constitutional 
violations occurring due to a lack of education funding, the Abbott remedy should be extended to rural 
school districts. 
 The first decision in the Bacon litigation, issued in 2002,106 was a partial victory, as only five of the 
seventeen petitioning districts prevailed, but it demonstrated the substantiality of the case for rural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 384 (emphasis added). 
105 Bacon v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ. (Bacon I), OAL DKT NOS. EDU 2637-00–2656-00, 2002 WL 31232958 (N.J. 
Adm. Sept. 23, 2002). 
For the purposes of this paper, a numerical naming system for identifying the various Bacon decisions will be 
implemented, akin to that used in the Abbott decisions. Note, however, that the Bacon decisions are not colloquially 
known by any numeric designation, unlike the Abbott cases, which are commonly referred to in case law and news 
coverage using Roman numerals.  
106 Many procedural hurdles had to be cleared for the case to reach the trial stage, resulting in nearly four years 
of delay before the seventeen Bacon districts could present their arguments before a court. Id. at 3–4. To emphasize the 
delay in terms of judicial speed or lack thereof, in the interim between the initial filing and the first Bacon decision from 
the ALJ, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued five decisions in the Abbott litigation: Abbott V, Abbott VI, Abbott VII, 
Abbott VIII and Abbott IX. Education Law Center, To view these decisions, see Abbott Decisions, EDUC. LAW CTR., 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/cases/abbott-v-burke/abbott-decisions.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
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districts.  In describing the five districts for which he found a violation of the “thorough and efficient” 
education clause, the ALJ wrote that the districts “present[ed] a grim fusion of socioeconomic 
deprivation, limited educational opportunity, facility deficiency and academic underperformance.”107  
The five districts deemed as “special needs districts” (SNDs) were all DFG A (the most impoverished, 
needy districts in the state), had substandard test scores and had, overall, profiles similar to the thirty 
Abbott districts.108  
In the twelve districts he held not to be SNDs, the ALJ determined that lack of education 
funding or relative community poverty was not adversely affecting education standards severely enough 
to warrant state intervention.109  The ALJ also directly addressed the plaintiff’s contention that the 
relative educational success of some of the impoverished Bacon districts should not be misunderstood as 
proof that greater funding is not needed.  The ALJ recognized that the court rewarded failing SNDs with 
increased funding and unintentionally penalized successful SNDs by withholding the increases, but 
instead chose to view Abbott as a “palliative for deeply entrenched misery” which included poor 
educational output in addition to poverty and other circumstances.110  
 In Bacon II, the Commissioner of the NJ DOE overturned the ALJ decision as to four of the five 
districts he had identified as SNDs.111  The Commissioner determined that only one district, Salem 
City,112 qualified as having a situation dire enough to require state action to ameliorate a constitutional 
harm.113  The Commissioner believed that the issues in the remaining sixteen Bacon districts were not 
matters of a “constitutional dimension” and thus best handled by the legislature, the executive, and the 
NJ DOE.114  A key point of contention for the Commissioner was whether inadequate facilities should 
factor into the analysis of CEIFA’s constitutionality.  While the districts argued that facilities were a 
major factor in the Abbott litigation,115 the Commissioner decided that the Educational Facilities 
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107 Five districts sufficiently demonstrated a constitutional violation from the Abbott II standard, which the 
court defined here as circumstances of “clear, severe, extensive, and . . . long duration.”  Bacon I, supra note 105, at 8. 
108 For example, the Buena Regional School District (in which the namesake plaintiff resided) was a DFG A 
district “roughly in the upper middle of the Abbott spectrum” with student suspension rates much higher than Abbott 
averages and issues with overcrowding and antiquated facilities. Id. at 27–37. 
109 Id. at 63–67. For example, the Lakehurst School District was found to be a “relatively poor working-class 
community that is performing reasonably well.” Id. at 67. The ALJ reached this conclusion, despite Lakehurst having a 
similar profile to the Abbott districts regarding poverty levels and certain school performance indicators (such as 
suspension rate, student mobility and special education rates), because the standardized test data was quite good and 
attendance was above the state average in spite of the district’s weaknesses and needs. Id. at 66–67. In other words, 
despite poverty and a student body with needs akin to Abbott district students, their relative triumphs foreclose 
additional state aid, when adequate funding could prove extraordinarily effective, given past performance. 
110 Id. at 8. 
111 Bacon v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ. (Bacon II), (N.J. Comm’r of Educ., Feb. 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2003/feb/50-03.pdf.  
112 Upon recommendation by the NJ DOE following the Bacon II decision, Salem City was added as an official 
Abbott district by an act of the New Jersey State Legislature. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-3 (2004). 
113 The Commissioner interpreted Abbott as “a remedy for poverty and educational failure so substantial, 
pervasive and durable that targeted efforts simply cannot produce a constitutionally sufficient result.” Bacon II, supra note 
111, at 137. 
114 Bacon II, supra note 111, at 137–38.  
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Construction and Financing Act (EFCFA), a special remedial legislation designed to fund and carry out 
the construction of new school facilities passed in the wake of Abbott V, should govern in the present 
claims.  In essence, the Commissioner divorced facilities from funding in his analysis of a “thorough and 
efficient” education.  As a result, the Commissioner denied Abbott-type relief but instead recommended 
specific evaluations to determine need.116 
2. The Breakthrough: Bacon III  and Bacon IV  
Several districts appealed to the New Jersey State Board of Education, arguing that the 
Commissioner erred in ruling CEIFA constitutional as applied to the plaintiff school districts.  In Bacon 
III, all sixteen rural districts from Bacon I triumphed in demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the 
state’s funding scheme as applied to them.117  First, the State Board spurned the Commissioner’s reliance 
on standardized test scores as flawed for multiple reasons,118 and instead turned to the Abbott II decision 
for proper guidance on assessing the sufficiency of education in the Bacon districts.  In relying upon 
Abbott II, the State Board evaluated the educational inputs, focusing primarily on funding, in assessing 
the constitutional adequacy of education.119  A second victory came in the invocation of the Abbott 
needs-based analysis; chiefly, that poor districts with higher concentrations of special needs students and 
worse socioeconomic conditions “required an educational offering that contained elements over and above 
those found in affluent suburban districts.”120  Third, the State Board rejected the Commissioner’s 
exclusion of facilities in determining if a “thorough and efficient” education was being provided.121  
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115 See supra Part II.B.3, p. 17–18 (discussion of findings in Abbott II). 
116 Bacon II, supra note 111, at 169. 
117 Bacon v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ. (Bacon III), (N.J. State Bd. of. Educ., Jan. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/legal/sboe/2006/jan/sb4-03.pdf.  
118 The State Board noted three flaws in relying too heavily upon standardized test scores to determine the 
constitutional adequacy of education.  First is the incompleteness of the testing: only three subjects (language arts, 
science and mathematics) are assessed on these tests, but “a thorough and efficient education encompasses far more 
than these three subject areas.” Id. at 27.  Second is the limited timeframe. Id. at 37. Third is the lack of high school data, 
as most of the Bacon districts end at eighth grade. Id. at 38. 
119 Id. at 28. “We deal with the problem in those terms because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we 
have been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate.” Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 399 (N.J. 
1990) (citing Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 273) (emphasis in original). The issue of “other viable criterion” was handled, in 
part, in Abbott IV, where the court declined to replace the educational inputs assessment with a purely standards-based 
approach. 
120 Bacon III, supra note 117, at 30 (emphasis added). The Education Law Center, the non-profit litigators for the 
Abbott districts, filed an amicus curiae brief that argued the Bacon litigation must be judged by the Abbott II and Abbott IV 
criteria, described as: “social, economic and educational factors that produce an environment in which the provision of a 
constitutionally adequate education is effectively impossible without such status.” Id. at 13. 
121 Id. at 32. The Commissioner’s conclusion was contrary to a litany of prior statements from the Supreme 
Court on the utmost importance of school facilities and the state’s constitutional duty to ensure adequate facilities.  See 
Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 273 (“A thorough and efficient education also requires adequate physical facilities.”); Abbott II, 
575 A.2d at 397 (“[D]eficient facilities are conducive to a deficient education.”); Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 437 
(“Deteriorating physical facilities relate to the State’s educational obligation, and we continually have noted that adequate 
physical facilities are an essential component of that constitutional mandate.); Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 470 (“These 
deplorable conditions have a direct and deleterious impact on the education available to the at-risk children. The State’s 
constitutional educational obligation includes the provision of adequate school facilities.”); and supra Part I.B.3, p. 19–20 
(examples of deficient conditions). 
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Interpreting the evidence and utilizing legal standards in a way most beneficial to the petitioners, 
the State Board went on to find a constitutional violation in all sixteen Bacon districts, but stopped short 
of declaring CEIFA itself unconstitutional because of its jurisdictional limitations.122  The State Board 
concluded that the Bacon districts were failing to provide a “thorough and efficient” education based on 
the evidentiary record before the ALJ and the Commissioner.123  
3. The Purgatory: State in Violation of Constitution with Regard to Bacon Districts, but 
No Remedy 
Despite the State Board finding the Bacon districts failed to provide a “thorough and efficient” 
education to its students, the Board in Bacon III refused to recommend the Abbott remedy.  The State 
Board claimed that each Bacon district had unique circumstances that differentiated an individual rural 
district from the urban districts and the other rural districts, whereas the Abbott districts were similar 
enough to each other to receive a universal remedy.124 Because of this belief, the State Board determined 
that a full implementation of the Abbott remedy was improper.  Instead, the State Board directed the NJ 
DOE to assess the needs of the Bacon districts individually; in essence, requesting more information and 
deferring to the legislature and executive to conjure up a new remedy tailored to these districts.125   
The State Board argued that “different approaches will be required than those utilized in poor 
urban districts” to properly remedy constitutional violations in the rural school districts.126 Curiously, 
however, the State Board reasoned that “growing up in poverty is basically the same, regardless of the 
district” while simultaneously suggesting that the solutions may differ between urban and non-urban 
districts.127  What makes these two statements intriguing is that, while solutions for poverty undoubtedly 
differ between Newark and rural South New Jersey, the context of poverty here is limited to the impact 
it has upon education funding, and a comprehensive remedy had already been devised over the course of 
many years of litigation and judicial-legislative interplay in Abbott.  Given the narrow facts at issue in 
Bacon, the State Board was tasked with simply evaluating the inadequacy of education funding and 
providing relevant solutions, not with devising a means of eradicating the root causes of poverty in rural 
areas.  The idea promoted by the State Board here – that because each rural district is a unique 
snowflake, the Abbott remedy is inappropriate – is unsatisfying. 
Given the history of repeated delays and ineffective solutions in legislative and executive 
responses to court orders in the Robinson and Abbott litigation, it should come as little surprise that the 
Commissioner, ordered by the State Board to conduct and complete an assessment of all sixteen Bacon 
districts within two months of the decision,128 delayed in filing the court-mandated report.  The 
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122 The State Board describes the legitimacy, authority, duty and limitations on its jurisdiction in greater detail.  
Bacon III, supra note 117, at 33–34 n.16. 
123 Id. at 40–41. “[W]e have adopted and relied upon the ALJ’s factual findings in arriving at our conclusions.” 
Id. at 35 n.17. 
124 Bacon III, supra note 117, at 59. “In addition, each district involved must  confront a particular set of 
circumstances not necessarily  shared by other poor districts whether urban or not, as, for example, a significant  number 
of students whose parents earn  their living through migrant labor.” 
125 Id. at 70.  
126 Id. at 59.  
127 Id. at 66. 
128 Bacon III, supra note 117, at 69. 
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Commissioner cited the successor legislation for CEIFA that was, at the time, being drafted in a joint 
effort between then-Governor Jon Corzine and the legislature as the source of the delay.129  With no 
remedy in place and an official report from the Commissioner of Education that deferred any further 
reporting, thus delaying the construction of a remedy even longer, the Bacon districts appealed again – 
this time to the judiciary.  
Bacon IV was argued before the New Jersey Appellate Division and decided in March 2008.130  
Most critically, the timing of the decision placed it one month after the enactment of the School Funding 
Reform Act (SFRA), the legislation that replaced CEIFA.131  The Court in Bacon IV relied heavily upon 
the State Board’s decision in Bacon III, and also found the SFRA to be a highly significant new 
development.  Upon evaluation of the record, the Court confirmed that there was a constitutional 
violation of students’ rights to a “thorough and efficient education” in the Bacon districts.132  In deference 
to the legislature and the recently passed SFRA, however, the Court was unwilling to provide a 
remedy.133  Instead of ordering the Abbott remedy or any other remedial measure, the State Board’s 
decision in Bacon III was restated and reordered: a study to determine the individual needs of the Bacon 
districts must be conducted in light of the SFRA and completed within six months.  Declaring the study 
“the very least [that] our constitutional duty demands,” the Court callously noted that “constitutional 
violations must be remedied in a timely fashion.”134  
Remedies have been anything but timely, as the Appellate Division’s decision came in the 
eleventh year of the Bacon litigation and with several prior decisions also emphasizing the uniqueness of 
each Bacon district and thus the necessity of further individualized studies.  Meanwhile, an entire class of 
children graduated from the K12 public school system in the Bacon districts.  To quote the majority 
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129 Press Release, Educ. Law Ctr., Commissioner Delays Relief to NJ Rural Students (June 23, 1996), available at 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/news/archives/school-funding/209.html.  For full text of the actual report, see Report to 
New Jersey State Board of Education: Implementation of the Bacon Decision, EDUC. LAW CTR. (May 26, 2006), 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/Newsblasts/elcnews_060623_BaconDecision.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 
2012). 
130 Bacon v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ. (Bacon IV), 942 A.2d 827 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2008). 
131 School Funding Reform Act of 2008 (SFRA), N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:7F-43 (2008).  The SFRA aimed to 
create a unified school funding formula for the entirety of New Jersey. The SFRA was initially declared constitutional by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2009, as applying the funding formulas to the Abbott districts. The Court, however, 
refused to abolish the Abbott district distinction, leaving intact the programs it established a decade earlier; the decision 
was limited to the funding streams. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XX), 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2009). 
The ELC is currently challenging budget cuts made in 2010 and 2011 as rendering the SFRA unconstitutional 
as to the Abbott districts.  The Supreme Court remanded the case in January of 2011 for fact-finding, putting the onus on 
the State to demonstrate that a “thorough and efficient” education can be delivered with the reduced budget.  Jeanette 
Rundquist and Jessica Calefati, N.J. Supreme Court Orders State to Prove Christie’s Funding Formula is Sufficient, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/nj_supreme_court_orders_state.html. 
132 Bacon IV, 942 A.2d at 837. 
133 Id. at 837.  While the track record of success is dubious at best, the Court cites Robinson II, Robinson V, Abbott 
II and Abbott III as examples of the judiciary deferring to the legislature to fashion a suitable remedy for the 
constitutional harms that were outlined in those cases.  “[A]n alternative ‘wait and see’ approach . . . usually is both 
prudent and preferred in constitutional jurisprudence, and the Court has taken that approach in the past.”  Id. (citing 
Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 445). 
134 Bacon IV, 942 A.2d at 839 (emphasis added). 
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from Abbott II, “[Students in poor districts] have already waited too long for a remedy, one that will give 
them the same level of opportunity, the same chance, as their colleagues who are lucky enough to be 
born in a richer suburban district.”135  For the Bacon districts, the deferral of a remedy has equated to the 
denial of one. 
4. The Aftermath and Current Status: Further Delays and Deprival 
The Commissioner of Education issued her report on the Bacon districts on September 14, 2009, 
eighteen months after the Bacon IV decision and a full year after the court-ordered completion date.  The 
needs assessment report found that all sixteen Bacon districts could provide a “thorough and efficient” 
education under the new SFRA funding regime.  The report, however, was flawed in numerous respects.  
First, the orders of the State Board and the Court were ignored again, as the report lacked a detailed 
analysis into the special needs of each of the rural Bacon districts.  Fred Jacob, the lead attorney 
representing the Bacon districts, derided the state’s investigation as being “[a] drive-by, cursory review” of 
family poverty, district poverty in terms of taxable property value and poor facilities, and for containing 
nothing specifically addressing the unique problems facing rural communities in New Jersey.136  ELC 
described the State Needs Assessments of the Bacon districts as failing to investigate the difficulties faced 
by students coming from families of migrant workers, Spanish-speaking parents or families without 
adequate health care.   
The SFRA was underfunded for the 200910 school year, resulting in a shortfall of $8.6 million 
of state education aid pledged to seven of the Bacon districts.137  With a finding that the current funding 
system was a violation of the constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” education, and the 
acknowledgement that more funding, additional programs and particularized plans were necessary to 
alleviate the harm done to the students, this underfunding exacerbates the constitutional harm.  An 
underfunded state education aid statute “does nothing more than tell the SNDs to reorganize (and thus 
become more efficient, like the model) and to achieve at higher levels (even though they have been 
failing abysmally), with either the same amount of money or less than they had before.”138  
Education budgets have been cut severely since the enactment of the SFRA.139  Even if the 
SFRA were fully funded by the State, however, the funding would still be inadequate to address the 
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135 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 380 (N.J. 1990). 
136 News Release, Educ. Law Ctr., State Turns Its Back on Rural School Children (Oct. 29, 2009) (on file with the 
Columbia Journal of Race and Law). 
137 Id. For a funding breakdown of all the districts, see “Bacon” Districts 2009–10 State Aid Shortfalls, EDUC. LAW 
CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/Newsblasts/elcnews_091028_BaconDistrictsChart.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2012). 
138 Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 442 (N.J. 1997) (referring to an inadequately funded CEIFA as applied to SNDs). 
139 Governor Chris Christie, in attempting to tackle New Jersey’s $10 billion budget deficit, cut state education 
funding by $820 million in 2010.  For the 2011 fiscal year, Christie has announced an estimated $250 million increase 
from 2010, thus leaving a net reduction of roughly $570 million from his 2010 cuts. Megan DeMarco & Ginger Gibson, 
N.J. to Restore a Fifth of Slashed State Aid for Schools Under Gov. Christie’s Budget, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 24, 2011, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/02/nj_to_restore_a_fifth_of_slash.html.  The court estimated that the SFRA 
was $1.6 billion below optimal funding.  Abbott v. Burke (Abbott XXI), 20 A.3d 1018, 1026 (N.J. 2011).  Thus, while the 
SFRA was underfunded regardless of Christie’s budget cuts, the cuts deepened an existing constitutional harm. 
Polling data from New Jersey school officials prior to the 2010–11 school year demonstrates that the impact of 
the state cuts to education aid has caused larger class sizes, fewer teachers, reduced funding for after-school and other 
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special needs of these Bacon districts, thus the constitutional violation remains and the students continue 
to be harmed.  The dollar amounts may appear nominal in some cases, such as a shortfall of $73,447 for 
Lawrence Township, but crucial to the analysis is the understanding that these districts were identified as 
SNDs.  As a SND, funding beyond what a hypothetically normal school district would require is 
necessary to overcome the myriad of problems these districts must cope with (facilities, poverty, special 
needs students, etc.).  The court has declared that supplemental programs in SNDs are a “fundamental 
prerequisite to the fulfillment of the State’s constitutional obligation.”140 
In Bacon III, the State Board found it clear that “the children in [the Bacon districts] have special 
needs arising from the socioeconomic conditions in the districts.”141  Some of the highlighted aspects of 
the findings include high suspension rates, large class sizes, less qualified faculty members, higher-than-
average special education populations, overcrowding, inadequate facilities, a curriculum lacking “breadth 
of [academic] programming,” high mobility rates amongst students, impoverished districts based on local 
property wealth and family income, lack of special-needs programs such as drug counseling, and lack of 
adequate early education of programs.142  In the records of the Abbott cases, many of these same 
conditions were found to be evidence of districts with special needs that needed to correct their failure 
to educate in accordance with their constitutional requirement.  
For comparison’s sake, the Abbott districts, which are similarly classified as SNDs, continue to 
receive constitutionally mandated funding levels on par with the wealthiest suburban districts in New Jersey.  
In addition to funding parity, the Abbott districts receive many beneficial supplemental programs, such as 
free preschool and all-day kindergarten as ordered by Abbott V, funded and designed specifically for 
special needs students.  While SFRA purports to increase state education aid to all districts, it does not 
contemplate the supplemental programs required in SNDs to achieve constitutional compliance.  The 
best-case scenario for the poor, rural Bacon districts, under a fully funded SFRA aid package, is an 
education that still fails to account for the special needs of the districts.  SFRA, therefore, even in the 
best-case scenario where New Jersey fully funds the legislation, can never satisfy the constitutional 
requirements of SNDs like the Bacon districts.  The reality of school funding in New Jersey since the 
passage of SFRA—marked by chronic underfunding and continued legal battles waged by the ELC to 
ensure the state fully honors its obligation—has fallen far short of the legislature’s goals. 
B. The Urban/Rural Distinction of Abbot t  v .  Burke  and Bacon v .  NJ DOE  
1. Why Does Abbot t  Only Apply to Urban Districts? 
The primary, and arguably sole, distinction between the Abbott and Bacon districts is the urban 
classification.  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott II first narrowed the prospective poor 
school districts in New Jersey, the districts labeled DFG A and DFG B, from 114 districts down to the 
twenty-nine districts within DFG A and B that the NJ DOE had designated as urban.143  There is an 
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additional programs.  Press Release, New Jersey School Boards Association, Schools to Reopen with Fewer Teachers, Larger 
Class Sizes, (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.njsba.org/press_releases/schools-to-reopen-with-fewer-
teachers.html?nr=339. 
140 Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 444. 
141 Bacon III, supra note 117, at 42 (emphasis added). 
142 Id. at 40–43. 
143 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 386–87 n.18 (N.J. 1990). 
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undeniable, fact-based logic to the Court’s analysis of the evidence in 1990, but the record developed at 
trial before Judge LeFelt, the thousands of pages of testimony and hundreds of exhibits, focused 
primarily upon poor urban districts, particularly the districts represented by the plaintiffs at trial.144  From 
the first filings on through to the landmark decisions in the 1990’s, the case was narrowly focused on 
poor urban districts, as opposed to poor districts found in all corners of New Jersey.  
The startling evidence of a state derelict in its duties to educate students in cities like Camden 
and Irvington, and the sheer magnitude of the problem in New Jersey’s urban areas, undoubtedly 
provided the strategic and moral motivations to pursue Abbott from an urban-centric position.  ELC’s 
focus proved immensely successful, but this initial limiting of plaintiffs and of the evidentiary record has 
caused tremendous roadblocks for non-urban districts in recent years. The court acknowledged the 
strength of the record when, in narrowing down the list of districts to receive the remedy, it stated, 
“There is no direct substantive evidence on this record of their failure to provide a thorough and efficient 
education.”145  The shadow of these findings in Abbott looms large over the Bacon litigation.  Amassing a 
record as vast as the one presented for the poor urban districts in Abbott is difficult due to the small size 
of the Bacon districts, in both population and geography. 
2. Similarities Between the Abbot t  and Bacon  Districts 
The constant emphasis on the special needs of each individual rural district, as compared to the 
urban districts, obfuscates the many similarities in problems and needs between the two groups.  From 
the outset, the constitutional right at issue is the same: all students must receive a “thorough and 
efficient” education.  Likewise, the argument that the right has been violated is the same: inadequate 
funding prevents poor school districts from providing the constitutionally required level of education to 
their students.  
First, all of the Abbott and Bacon districts are very poor compared to the New Jersey state 
average.  All of the Bacon districts possess a DFG rating of A or B, just like the Abbott districts currently 
benefiting from the remedial orders.146  The DFG rating is significant, as a lack of urbanization and 
population density is considered a mitigating factor in a district’s relative poverty and also the district’s 
need for mandated funding.147  Both groups of districts have an impoverished and thus deficient local 
property tax base, resulting in an inability to generate constitutionally adequate education funding from 
their citizens.  Central to the findings in the Abbott decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
repeatedly declared that the state cannot put undue emphasis on the Abbott districts to tax its citizens to 
produce the necessary funding to achieve constitutional compliance.148  Neither the Abbott nor the Bacon 
districts possess the financial wherewithal to overcome the lack of funding via local taxation, and the 
court recognized this problem and forbid reliance upon local taxation when ordering a remedy for the 
violation in the urban districts. 
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144 Camden, East Orange, Jersey City and Irvington. Id. at 363. 
145 Id. at 387 (emphasis added). 
146 Bacon III, supra note 117, at 42. 
147 DFG Factors, supra note 55.  For court’s statement on relevancy of urbanization and density, see discussion, 
infra Part II.B.3, p. 21. 
148 See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 409 (ruling on the 1975 Act); and Abbott III, 643 A.2d 575, 576, 578 (N.J. 1994) 
(ruling on the QEA). 
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Second, both groups of districts have special needs to address, apart from the wealthy districts, 
which necessitate not merely funding parity but greater levels of funding.  Failure to address the special 
needs of the urban districts was a major point of contention for the court when declaring the state 
funding acts unconstitutional.  In Abbott II, the court observed that providing the same level of 
education to a regular student and a “severely disadvantaged” student would do nothing to eliminate the 
existing gap, thus perpetuating the difference.149  As such, the court decided that “necessarily” means 
that, in poorer urban districts, something more must be added to the regular education in order to 
achieve the command of the Constitution” to provide a “thorough and efficient” education.150  
IV. A PROPOSAL: DISREGARD THE URBAN CRITERIA AND GRANT THE ABBOTT 
REMEDY  
Part III argues that the Bacon districts deserve the full remedy granted to the Abbott districts.  Legal 
analysis of the Abbott cases will prove that they make the same legal claim as the Abbott cases and 
therefore deserve the same remedy to end the constitutional harm. Given the principles espoused in 
Abbott, the Bacon districts must be afforded the same protections and are legally deserving of the same 
remedy.  Evidence of the importance of the increased school funding, vis-à-vis the success of the Abbott 
remedy in certain school districts, further bolsters the argument for granting the Abbott remedy.  
A. The Constitutional Right Must Take Precedent Over Urban Classification 
Considering that a remedy was fought for and won in the Abbott litigation for poor urban 
districts that demonstrated severe needs, it is curious why the rural districts, arguing their case nearly a 
decade after the landmark remedial decisions of Abbott IV and Abbott V, struggle to obtain a remedy for 
their own educational plight.  Repeated often in the Bacon litigation is the urban/rural divide: what is 
appropriate for urban districts is not necessarily appropriate for rural districts.  Differences in 
demographics and urbanization suggest an approach tailored towards rural districts is appropriate.151  
Thus, the question remains: why is this distinction so critical?  If an education funding system is found 
unconstitutional as applied to a school district, should urbanization matter in determining the 
expansiveness of the remedy, or instead should the right itself be paramount, and the similarities of the 
harm dictate the remedy?  Given the legal and policy consequences of emphasizing this distinction, it 
should not factor into the analysis.152 Remedial plans for an acknowledged violation of the same 
constitutional right should not depend upon the population densities.  It should instead come down to 
the efficacy of the existing remedy and the ability to implement the remedy to new populations. 
Educational equity litigation in New Jersey suffers from competing goals: the general principle of 
eradicating inadequate and unconstitutional educational conditions within the state, and the specific issue 
of violations in poor urban districts as shown by the evidentiary record produced at trial proceeding 
Abbott II.  Despite this struggle, there is ample evidence found in the Court’s Abbott decisions that 
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149 Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 402 (N.J. 1990). 
150 Id. at 403. 
151 The State Board’s order for an individualized assessment of the Bacon districts was “focus[ed] on the unique 
set of circumstances confronting students of . . . poor rural districts that distinguish them from their urban 
counterparts.”  Bacon IV, 942 A.2d 827, 838 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2008). 
152 The State Board found that “the conditions under which [Bacon district] students live[d] mirror[ed] those of 
the students in the Abbott Districts, which in some cases are only blocks away.” Bacon IV, supra note 130, at 833 (citing Bacon III, 
supra note 117, at 43) (emphasis added). 
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demonstrate a clear statement of the larger principles that serve as the spirit of Abbott; principles that 
apply to the Bacon districts and any other district that the Court finds to be in violation of the “thorough 
and efficient” education clause.  The Court in Abbott IV explicitly declared that:  
The constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient education attaches to every school 
district, and indeed, to every individual school in the State.  Of course, the right to a thorough 
and efficient education does not ensure that every student will succeed.  It must, 
however, ensure that every child in New Jersey has the opportunity to achieve.153 
Every school district must provide a “thorough and efficient” education, as mandated by the New Jersey 
Constitution, or else innocent students are subjected to harm.  If “[the New Jersey] Constitution 
demands that every child be given an equal opportunity to meet his or her promise,” then the promise of 
a child attending inadequate public schools is suffering a possibly irreparable constitutional injury with 
every school year that passes.154  These principles surely apply to students in poor rural districts as 
strongly as they apply to poor urban students, wealthy suburban students, and indeed, all students within 
New Jersey. 
In the most recent decision in the Abbott litigation from May 2011,155 the court ruled that 
Governor Christie’s underfunding of the SFRA amounted to a constitutional violation of the rights of 
students.  Two years prior, the court in Abbott XX had upheld the constitutionality of the SFRA 
statewide, but with an explicit condition to fully fund the SFRA.156  With the SFRA underfunded by 
nearly $1.6 billion,157 the ELC brought suit. 
Yet a majority of the supreme court again limited its findings to the Abbott districts.158  Absent 
full funding, the implication was that the court would reevaluate the legislation’s constitutionality.  This 
limitation came despite the court specifically remanding Abbott XXI for trial with an order to investigate 
the constitutional harms inflicted by the education funding cuts on all districts: “whether school funding 
through SFRA, at current levels, can provide for the constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient 
education for New Jersey school children.”159 The trial court, under this remand order, investigated the 
impact of education budget cuts to students statewide and found that a stunning 205 of New Jersey’s 560 
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153 Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 443 (emphasis added). 
154 Id. at 445. 
155 Abbott XXI, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011) 
156 Abbott XX, 971 A.2d 989, 993 (2009) (“[A] state funding formula’s constitutionality is not an occurrence at a 
moment in time; it is a continuing obligation.  Today’s holding issues in the good faith anticipation of a continued 
commitment by the Legislature and Executive to address whatever adjustments are necessary to keep SFRA operating at 
its optimal level.”). 
157 Abbott XXI, 20 A.3d at 1026. 
158 Id. at 1036 (“[Christie’s budget] reductions have had a significant impact on the beneficiaries of our prior 
remedial orders, namely the plaintiff pupils of the Abbott districts.  It was to remedy their decades long constitutional 
deprivation that this Court issued remedial orders.”). 
159 Opinion/Recommendations to the Supreme Court at 6, Abbott v. Burke, (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2011) 
(No. M-1293), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/abbott/Abbott%20v%20Burke%20-%203-22-2011.pdf.  Judge 
Doyne, who has presided over many of the trials in the Abbott v. Burke litigation, specifically noted that the remand 
“addresses the rights of all New Jersey school children” rather than only the Abbott students, and that this was a 
departure from the prior remands. Id. at n.5.  
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school districts, including 59 high-need school districts, had below adequate school expenditures in 
2011.160  In spite of the  evidentiary record at trial, the majority nevertheless confined the scope of their 
decision and remedial order in Abbott XXI, justifying their stance by proclaiming restrictions on the 
court’s power and jurisdiction; namely, that the non-urban plaintiffs are not present, therefore, they 
cannot receive a ruling on their case.161  
Justice Barry T. Albin, in filing a concurrence in Abbott XXI, explicitly addressed the 
constitutional, legal, and principled inconsistencies of limiting funding remedies to the Abbott districts 
when others, including the rural Bacon districts, are similarly underfunded and in dire need of assistance.  
Justice Albin departed from the majority in stating that the judicial remedy should include all students in 
New Jersey who reside in underfunded districts, not merely those who live in the Abbott districts.162  
Citing the extensive evidentiary record from the trial court,163 there were 205 school districts that are 
unable to provide the constitutionally required “thorough and efficient” education.164  With the majority 
proffering an unjust solution in the curtailment of the remedy to a select class of constitutionally harmed 
students, Justice Albin described the perils that await the remaining students.  He referenced the problem 
of incessant delays that have plagued the needy Bacon districts for the past fourteen years: “[t]he redress 
of the rights of those students [in underfunded districts] now must await a day when it may be too late 
for them to enjoy their right to a constitutionally adequate education.”165  Given the court’s narrow 
tailoring of the Abbott litigation and remedy to the Abbott districts whose funding schemes were declared 
unconstitutional back in 1990, the Bacon litigation should push forward, relying on the strength of Justice 
Albin’s concurrence and with their own evidentiary record, to achieve justice. 
B. Implement the Abbot t  Remedy Because the Remedy Can Work  
For all of the controversy surrounding the Abbott litigation and, specifically, the remedial orders 
of funding parity with the wealthiest districts in New Jersey and additional funding for supplemental 
programs such as pre-kindergarten, the entire public policy debate can be reduced to one simple 
question: has the remedy worked?  Spending without results is wasteful spending. Abbott ordered parity 
in funding between the poor urban districts and the wealthiest suburbs because of the notion that money 
was a critical factor in providing a quality education.  While a broader discussion of the efficacy of 
money in ameliorating the problems our education system faces is a fiercely debated issue that is well 
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160 Abbott XXI, 20 A.3d 1018, 1095 (N.J. 2011).  In sum, seventy-two percent of the state’s high-risk students 
were residing in districts that were below adequacy. 
161 Id. at 1043 (“The extent of this Court’s jurisdiction in this matter starts and ends with the series of litigated 
proceedings that preceded this action . . . [t]his Court’s jurisdiction is limited to rectification of the constitutional 
violation suffered by the Abbott litigants.”). 
162 Id. at  1101 (Albin, J., concurring) (“The at-risk children in the 187 underfunded non-Abbott districts suffer 
from the same disadvantages of poverty as the children in the former Abbott districts.”). 
163 Included in the evidence at trial was testimony from superintendents representing non-Abbott school 
districts, one of which, Buena Vista Regional, is a member of the Bacon plaintiff class.  Id. at 1104, 1105. 
164 Id. at 1105. 
165 Id. at 1109. 
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beyond the scope of this note,166 a much narrower look at the impact of the funding increases from 
Abbott is in order, and the results are promising. 
The one undeniable result of the Abbott litigation is the substantial increase in education 
spending in the thirty-one Abbott districts.  Overall, the Abbott districts have far greater resources now 
than they did prior to the court-ordered parity of school funding in Abbott IV.  As of 2007, Abbott 
districts were spending, on average, twenty percent more than the wealthiest districts in New Jersey.167  
For a nationwide comparison, of the one hundred largest school districts in the United States, the 
Newark, New Jersey, school district has the highest per-pupil expenditure, with a total that is 224% 
greater than the average of the remaining ninety-nine school districts.168  Newark tops this list due to the 
seventy-four percent increase in education spending resulting from the parity order in Abbott IV.  
Spending, therefore, has increased significantly. 
Successful improvements in education are evidenced in several Abbott districts.169  Applying the 
Abbott remedy to the Bacon districts, coupled with closely mirroring the strategies taken in the most 
successful Abbott districts, will surely create a greater learning environment for the currently inadequately 
educated students. 
Perhaps the greatest success story of Abbott v. Burke is Union City.  The demographic profile of 
Union City schools would suggest challenges in providing an adequate education. Union City is the most 
densely populated city in the United States, with 67,000 plus people living on just over one square mile 
of land.170  Ninety-six percent of students in Union City are Latino, and a large percentage of these 
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166 The most famous critic of increasing education funding, without other reforms to the system, is Eric 
Hanushek.  Hanushek has argued that increasing funding for education is an inefficient and ineffective means of 
improving the quality of education in schools.  See Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in 
Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1141 (1986).  This article has been cited several hundred times in academic papers.  Eric 
Hanushek has appeared as a witness in numerous lawsuits on behalf of states, defending school funding systems from 
allegations of unfairness from plaintiffs. 
Hanushek’s position in the debate regarding the efficacy of increased funding for schools has provoked 
considerable criticism from scholars and judges alike.  See generally MICHAEL A. REBELL & JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI, OF 
COURSE MONEY MATTERS: WHY THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY NEVER ADDED UP (2004), available at 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/research/MoneyMattersFeb2004.pdf.  Statistical analysis of the data 
set utilized by Hanushek disputes his claim that education funding has no meaningful relation to increased educational 
outcomes.  L.V. Hedges, R.D. Laine & R. Greenwald, Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of 
Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, 23 EDUC. RES. 5 (1994).  
Hanushek himself admitted the efficacy of increased funding while testifying in an educational equity case: 
“[M]oney spent wisely, logically and with accountability would be very useful indeed.” MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS & 
KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 34 (2009). 
167 GORDON MACINNES, IN PLAIN SIGHT: SIMPLE, DIFFICULT LESSONS FROM NEW JERSEY’S EXPENSIVE 
EFFORT TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 26 (2009). 
168 Id. at 27. 
169 See infra Part IV.B (including profile of Union City’s school district). 
170 Union City, New Jersey: Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1&-
ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-_lang=en&-geo_id=16000US3474630 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).  
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students are English Language Learners (ELLs).  The district itself is the poorest in New Jersey,171 and 
its per-pupil expenditures are in the bottom quarter of the Abbott districts (though the expenditures still 
represent a seventy-two percent increase from pre-Abbott levels).  Yet Union City has persevered, 
becoming a shining example of a poor district facing immense difficulties that nevertheless has narrowed 
the achievement gap between its disadvantaged students and students in wealthier districts.  In the span 
of only nine years after the parity-funding order in Abbott IV, proficiency amongst Union City eighth 
graders has risen dramatically and approached the statewide average of proficiency amongst non-Abbott 
students.  This achievement exemplifies the goal of Abbott and demonstrates both the efficacy of the 
remedy and that such gains are possible, and not merely ideals.172 
Gordon MacInnes argues that the most important reason driving the great success of Union City 
in improving its quality of education is the emphasis on early education programs that stress early 
literacy.173  An analysis of specific education reforms is best left to educators and experts on education 
policy, but a brief synopsis here assists in proving why the Abbott remedy is a useful tool if properly 
instituted and governed at the local level.  In studying the efficacy of post-Abbott reform, Gordon 
MacInnes studied several districts that sought to emulate the reform successes taking place in Union 
City.  Applying their now-increased resources in a focused, intelligent manner, the districts that emulated 
Union City’s emphasis on early childhood literacy all saw rapid gains.  Most promising is Elizabeth, New 
Jersey’s fourth largest and sixth poorest school district.  Elizabeth’s school district redoubled its 
emphasis on early elementary education and saw third grade performance improve by sixteen percent in 
only four years.174  
These districts have utilized their increased resources from the Abbott remedy (funding parity 
bestowed upon them by Abbott IV and the mandated early education programs from Abbott V) in a 
manner that can be replicated in the Bacon districts as well as the remaining Abbott districts.  What the 
Bacon districts lack is the adequate funding to aggressively pursue early education and increase literacy 
rates.  Union City is proof positive that astronomical per-pupil expenditures, rising to the level of 
Newark, are not necessary to succeed but it also shows the efficacy of increased funding in impoverished 
areas.  The court should not and cannot set New Jersey education curriculum, but it should look to the 
Union City experiment and strategy as a persuasive statement that their rulings and remedial orders can 
work. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ELC’s initial complaint in the Abbott litigation emphasized the impoverished communities 
and resulting educational inadequacies found in poor school districts:  
The money shortages . . . were the direct cause of the educational inadequacies in the 
poor districts—the dilapidated buildings, the bigger classes, the lower-paid and less-
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171 Measured by student eligibility for the free lunch program, a widely used means of determining poverty level 
of students. MACINNES, supra note 167, at 34. 
172 The gap in literacy between Union City students and non-Abbott students has closed from twenty-six 
percentage points to roughly equal in math, and from twenty-three percentage points to a mere three in language arts.  
Id. at 35.  For a visual representation of the gains made in nine years compared to the average non-Abbott district student 
and average Abbott district student, see id. fig.5.1. 
173 Id. at 36. 
174 Id. at 78. 
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experienced teachers. Yet the children who attended these inadequate schools had 
overwhelming educational needs . . . for they came from families with little money or 
education, scored poorly on standardized tests, and dropped out in large numbers.  In 
effect, students who needed the most got the least . . . .175 
These same principles and beliefs that were present in the earliest Abbott filings, and are evidenced in 
myriad of passages from subsequent Abbott decisions, can and should have a universal appeal.  The Bacon 
districts have sufficiently proven a constitutional violation of those students’ right to a “thorough and 
efficient” education at the Appellate Division level of the New Jersey Judiciary.  Individual analyses of 
the districts conducted by the State incurred long delays, and when the studies were finally conducted, 
they were not thorough and quick in declaring that the districts did not need any additional funding 
under SFRA.  The SFRA, in subsequent years, has been underfunded, creating budget shortfalls for the 
Bacon districts, rendering the education they provide their students even more constitutionally deficient 
than anticipated by the lackadaisical NJ DOE studies.  The indignation at the delays and constitutional 
deprivations that took place in Abbott, and the resulting court-ordered remedies, should be directed 
towards the aggrieved schoolchildren in the rural Bacon school districts.  An entire generation of students 
has entered into constitutionally deficient schools in Bacon districts at kindergarten and graduated high 
school during the time in which this matter has languished in the courts.  The courts must address the 
students’ aggrieved constitutional rights, as their educational futures require the full protection of the 
New Jersey state constitution. 
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